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Abstract—A blockchain and smart contract enabled security mechanism for IoT applications has been reported recently for urban,
financial, and network services. However, due to the power-intensive and a low-throughput consensus mechanism in existing
blockchain, like Bitcoin and Ethereum, there are still challenges in integrating blockchain technology into resource-constrained IoT
platforms. In this paper, Microchain, based on a hybrid Proof-of-Credit (PoC)-Voting-based Chain Finality (VCF) consensus protocol, is
proposed to provide a secure, scalable and lightweight distributed ledger for IoT systems. By using a bias-resistant randomness
protocol and a cryptographic sortition algorithm, a random subset of nodes are selected as a final committee to perform the consensus
protocol. The hybrid consensus mechanism relies on PoC, a pure Proof of stake (PoS) protocol, to determine whether or not a
participant is qualified to propose a block, given a fair initial distribution of the credit assignment. The voting-based chain finality
protocol is responsible for finalizing a history of blocks by resolving conflicting checkpoint and selecting a unique chain. A
proof-of-conception prototype is implemented and tested on a physical network environment. The experimental results verify that the
Micorchain is able to offer a partially decentralized, scalable and lightweight distributed ledger protocol for IoT applications.
Index Terms—Proof of Credit (PoC), Voting-based Chain Finality (VCF), Consensus, Blockchain, Internet of Things (IoT).
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1 INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) allows hetero-
geneous and lightweight smart devices to collaboratively
provide services with or without human intervention. With
an ever-increasing presence of IoT-based smart applications
and their ubiquitous visibility from the Internet, the highly
connected smart IoT devices with a huge volume of gen-
erated transaction data incur more concerns on security
and privacy [9]. IoT systems are deployed in a distributed
network environment that includes a large number of IoT
devices with high heterogeneity and dynamics. The hetero-
geneity and resource constraint at the edge necessitate a
scalable, flexible and lightweight system architecture that
supports fast development and easy deployment among
multiple application vendors using non-standard devel-
opment technology. Furthermore, those smart devices are
geographically scattered across near-site network edges,
and managed by fragmented service providers that enforce
different security policies. Thus, traditional security policies
on a centralized authority basis, which suffer from the
performance bottlenecks or single point of failures, are not
efficient and suitable to address performance and security
challenges in IoT systems.
Recently, designing new decentralized security mech-
anisms for distributed network applications becomes one
of the most intensively studied topics in academics and
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industries. Blockchain, which acts as the fundamental pro-
tocol of Bitcoin [23], has demonstrated great potential to
revolutionize the fundamentals of information technology
(IT) due to many attractive properties, such as decentraliza-
tion and transparency [25]. The blockchain enabled security
mechanisms for IoT-based applications have been reported
recently, for example, smart surveillance system [22], [24],
social security system [38], space situation awareness [37],
biometric imaging data processing [34], identification au-
thentication [13] and access control [35], [36]. Blockchain
and smart contract together are promising to provide a
decentralized security mechanism to IoT systems.
Integrating blockchain technologies into IoT systems
presents critical challenges in designing scalable and
lightweight blockchain protocols. Particularly, the perfor-
mance of blockchain networks significantly relies on the
performance of consensus mechanisms, e.g., in terms of
data consistency, speed of consensus finality, robustness to
arbitrarily behaving nodes, and network scalability [33].
Unfortunately, existing blockchain protocols are not suitable
to be directly merged to IoT scenarios. Most of the existing
permissionless blockchain networks (e.g., Bitcoin) require
solving a time-consuming hashing puzzle for block gen-
eration. Such hashing-intensive proof-of-work (PoW) con-
sensus mechanisms could guarantee the network scalability
and mitigate Sybil attacks; however, they are at the cost
of low throughput, high energy consumption and ever-
increased chain-data. The classical Byzantine consensus pro-
tocols, such as Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
[8], demonstrate a better performance with high throughout,
lower latency and limited overhead. However, they rely
on identity authentication and allow very limited network
scalability in terms of the number of nodes.
To address challenges in integrating blockchain tech-
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2nologies into IoT systems, we propose Microchain, a hybrid
Proof-of-Credit (PoC)-Voting-based Chain Finality (VCF)
blockchain architecture that provides a secure, scalable and
lightweight distributed ledger. Following the idea of del-
egation, microchain chooses a small subset of the nodes
in the network as validators, and those validators form
a final committee, called dynasty, to perform a consensus
function. The verifiable random function combining with
cryptographic sortition provide a bias-resistant randomness
foundation to periodically form a statistical representative
dynasty. The proposed novel PoC-VCF based final commit-
tee consensus mechanism not only offers higher efficiency
over protocols based on proof of physical resources like
PoW, but it is also more scalable than those classical BFT
enabled consensus solutions. In summary, this paper makes
the following contributions:
1) A systematic architecture of a microchain is intro-
duced, and key components and work flows are
explained;
2) A novel PoC-based block proposal mechanism is de-
signed to improve energy efficiency and throughput
of PoW-based blockchain;
3) A lightweight voting-based chain finality protocol is
developed for resolving the chain fork problem in
chain extension; and
4) A proof-of-concept prototype is implemented as a
private blockchain network and tested on Raspberry
Pi, and the experimental results validate the feasibil-
ity of running microchain on IoT systems with lower
energy assumption and communication overhead.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 reviews background knowledge of blockchain
consensus protocols. Section 3 introduces the microchain
architecture and describes the core features. A novel PoC-
based block proposal mechanism is explained in Section
4 and Section 5 illustrates the voting-based chain finality
protocol. The experimental results are discussed in Section
6. Finally, a summary is presented in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
As one of the most fundamental problems in fault-tolerant
distributed computing, consensus states that the processes
have to reach agreement in a non-trivial way. This agree-
ment takes the form of a value (called decision value) that
has to be one of the values proposed by the processes to the
consensus instance [26]. In the context of a distributed com-
puting environment, the consensus in blockchain networks
can be defined as a fault-tolerant state-machine replication
problem by maintaining the global blockchain state across
the P2P network. Each participating node maintains a local
replicate of the blockchain and shares it with other nodes.
All nodes make an agreement (consensus) on the unique
common replicate of the blockchain in the condition of
Byzantine failures [18], [27]. Given variant consensus pro-
tocols, the blockchain networks could be categorized into
permissionless blockchain (e.g., Nakamoto Consensus Pro-
tocols) and permissioned blockchain (e.g., Practical Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerant Consensus).
2.1 Nakamoto Consensus Protocols
To jointly address the critical issues, such as pseudonymity,
scalability and poor synchronization in an open-access
network environment, the Nakamoto consensus protocol
[23] is based on a Proof of Work (PoW) scheme. It is
implemented as the consensus foundation of Bitcoin, and
widely adopted by other cryptocurrency-based blockchain
networks. PoW is essentially an incentive-based consensus
protocol in which participants compete for rewards through
a cryptographic block-discovery racing game. Nakamoto
protocol introduces incentives to probabilistically award the
consensus participants to ensure proper functioning of a
permissionless blockchain network [23]. The Nakamoto con-
sensus protocols demonstrate scalability in a trustless open-
access network environment. However, PoW also incurs
several issues, such as limited throughput, high demand of
computation and storage resources as well as unsustainable
energy consumption.
To reduce energy consumption, Proof-of-Stake (PoS) was
proposed by Peercoin [15]. Within a Peercoin network, a
metric of “coin age” is proposed to measure a miner’s
stake by multiplying the held tokens and the holding time.
The PoS kernel protocol allows a miner to use its stake
to solve the puzzle solution, the probability of proposing
a new block follows the stake distribution. Compared to
PoW protocols that use brute-force hashing power to solve
computation-intensive puzzle solutions, PoS leverages the
distribution of token ownership to simulate a verifiable
random function to propose new blocks. Since the block
miners only consume limited resources, PoS is also known
as a process of “virtual mining” [5].
A number of alternative Proof of Concept (PoC) schemes
have been proposed to improve performance of existing
PoW in terms of security, fairness and sustainability. To ad-
dress the issues of centralized computation power pool, the
Proof of Memory (PoM), a memory-hard PoW is adopted by
ZCash [14] and Ethereum [6] networks. With the purpose
of useful resource provision, the idea of “Proof of Useful
Resources” (PoUS) has been proposed to tackle the resource
wasting problem of PoW [33]. The Proof of Exercise (PoE)
is proposed to replace the computation intensive search-
ing problem in PoW with the useful “exercise” of matrix
product problems [30]. Based on Trusted Execution Environ-
ment (TEE), Resource-Efficient Mining (REM) [40] verifies
and measures the software running in an Intel Software
Guard Extensions (SGX)-protected enclave that randomly
determines whether the work leads to a valid block proof.
2.2 Byzantine Fault Tolerant Consensus
The consensus in a distributed system can be expressed
abstractly as a Byzantine General Problem [18], which copes
with single value agreement among different parts of a
system given failure of communication or conflicting infor-
mation. The problem is solvable if and only if more than
two-thirds of the generals are loyal under oral messages.
Thus, a consensus protocol is called Byzantine Fault Tolerant
(BFT) if it can tolerate one or more byzantine failures while
making a correct agreement. For any BFT consensus proto-
col, the distributed network configuration should satisfy the
following requirement: N ≥ 3f + 1, where f is the number
3of Byzantine processes. The PBFT algorithm for Statement
Machine Replication (SMR) [17] that tolerates Byzantine
faults [8] and has been widely adopted as a basic consensus
solution in the blockchain community, like Hyperledge Fab-
ric [2]. The PBFT algorithm offers both liveness and safety in
asynchronous network environment given assumption that
at most of bn−13 c out of total of n replicas are Byzantine
faults. All peering nodes in PBFT are categorized as either a
leader node or some validating nodes. These peers will exe-
cute three phases of consensus protocol, called Pre-prepare,
Prepare and Commit, to make agreement on proposed new
blocks. As long as more than 2/3 of all nodes are honest
and they have successfully executed the Commit phase, the
transactions recorded in the validated blocks are appended
to the current chain.
To tackle the weakness of consensus algorithms that suf-
fer from high latency due to the requirement that all nodes
within the network communicate synchronously, Ripple [29]
is proposed to circumvent this requirement by utilizing
collectively-trusted subnetworks within the larger network.
In Ripple, all verified transactions will be added directly to
the raw ledger rather than through the chain of blocks. To
make the verification, each node maintains their own peer
list, called a unique node list (UNL), to broadcast the trans-
action to such subnetworks instead of to nodes of whole
network. The intersection of UNL by any two different peers
should be at least 1/5 of all the nodes over the network.
Since the “trust” required by these subnetworks is in fact
minimal and can be further reduced with principled choice
of the member nodes. The Ripple provides a low-latency
consensus algorithm which still maintains robustness in the
face of Byzantine failures [29]. As a variant of Ripple, Steller
[21] designed a new model for consensus called federated
Byzantine agreement (FBA), which ensures nodes agree
on slot contents. Similar to UNL in Ripple, Steller utilizes
quorum slices for consensus agreement made between trust
nodes, which is the same as validators in Ripple. In Steller
consensus process, sub-network level trust decisions are
made by nodes in a quorum, which is a set of nodes suffi-
cient to reach agreement. Then, the subset of a quorum work
together as a federated committee to determine system-level
agreement. Compared to decentralized proof of-work and
proof-of-stake schemes, Steller has modest computing and
financial requirements, lowering the barrier to entry and
potentially opening up financial systems to new participants
[21].
2.3 Hybird Consensus Protocol
To improve limited performance of permissionless con-
sensus without undermining the unique features such as
scalability, combining a scalable permissionless consensus
(eg., PoW) with a high throughput permissioned consensus
(e.g, BFT) becomes a prospective approach. The Bitcoin-
NG [11] is proposed to improve performance of PoW-based
Nakamoto protocol by by decoupling Bitcoins blockchain
operation into two planes: leader election and transac-
tion serialization. The protocol divides time into sequential
epochs, and only a single leader is in charge of serializing
state machine transitions in each epoch. To bootstrap the
transaction throughput, the protocol introduces two types
of blocks, namely, the key blocks that require a PoW puzzle
solution for leader election and the microblocks that require
no puzzle solution and are used for transaction serialization
[33]. Although Bitcoin-NG may also experience key block
forks, it scales optimally with bandwidth limited only by the
capacity of the individual nodes and latency limited only by
the propagation time of the network [11].
To design a computationally-scalable Byzantine consen-
sus protocol for blockchain, SCP [19] is proposed through
incorporating BFT and sharding into blockchain consensus.
The key ideas are inspired by concept of ”sharding” [10] in
infrastructures of distributed database and cloud. Through
securely establishing identities for network participants,
whole network are randomly divided into several sub-
committees. Each sub-committee performs a classical BFT
consensus protocol to process a separate set of transac-
tions and propose blocks in parallel. A final committee is
designated to combine the outputs of sub-committees into
an ordered blockchain data structure. To extend existing
consensus protocol based on SCP, Elastico [20] is proposed
to build a secure sharding protocol for open blockchains. In
a epoch, the candidates of committees attempt to find a PoW
puzzle solution provided a seed called ”epochRandomness”
that is a public random number string generated in previous
epoch. ELASTICO exhibits almost linear scalability through-
put with computation capacity with roughly O(n) message
complexity. However, the participants have to download
full blockchain data to perform the consensus task, which
brings latency in bootstrapping process and storage over-
load on client nodes.
To enable parallelization of both network consensus
and data storage, a ”full sharding” protocol called named
”OmniLedger” [16] is designed to provide ”statistically
representative” shards for permissionless transaction pro-
cessing. OmniLedger uses a bias-resistant protocol called
RandHound [32] to generate epoch global randomness
strings for sharding committees formation. To optimize
trade-off between the number of shards, throughput and
latency, the intra-shard consensus follows a ”Optional Trust-
but-Verify Validation” model, where optimistic validators
make a provisional but unlikely-to-change commitment and
core validators subsequently verify again the transactions
to provide finality and ensure verifiability [16]. To secure
corss-shard transactions, OmniLedger introduce a novel
Byzantine Shard Atomic Commit protocol to handle atom-
ically transactions processing acorss shards. Furthermore,
a gradually in-and-out committee members swap strategy
could reduce extra message overhead and bootstrapping
latency in shard reconstruction. Another epoch-based, two-
level-BFT protocol called RapidChain [39] is proposed for
scaling blockchain vie full sharding. RapidChain employs
block pipelining strategy to achieve very high through-
puts in intra-committee consensus. Further more, a novel
gossiping protocol for large blocks reduces large overhead
on committee-to-committee communication, and ensure an
efficient cross-shard transaction verification.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN OF MICROCHAIN
The goal of the Microchain is to enable a lightweight
distributed ledger system in resource constrained IoT en-
4vironments at the network edge, which is achieved by
introducing an efficient consensus mechanism running on
a small number of validators. The microchain network
proceeds transactions by a final committee in a fixed time
periods called dynasty epoch. A random committee for-
mation protocol ensures that committee selection process
is unpredictable. In each dynasty life time, a hybrid PoC-
VCF consensus mechanism is responsible for proposing
block and finalizing chain history given a unbounded time
delay. The final-committee consensus which is built on a
proof-of-stake based finality mechanism. A Proof-of-Credit
(PoC) protocol, which is a pure PoS mechanism, determines
whether a participant is selected to propose a block given
fair initial distribution of the credit stake to the committee
members in a given epoch. While a Voting based chain
finality (VCF) mechanism could protect against fork by
resolving conflicting checkpoints and finalize the history of
blockchain.
The microchain assumes a synchronous network in
which operations of processes are coordinated in rounds
with bounded delay constraints, and provides two formal
proprieties of a robust distributed ledger:
• Persistence: ensures a safety goal that all users should
agree on the same transactions and finalized trans-
actions should be in the same position in the dis-
tributed ledger. If a honest node of the system accepts
a transaction tx as finalized in block Bi, then any
other nodes could query tx in block Bi.
• Liveness: ensures that transactions submitted by hon-
est nodes are confirmed in finalized blocks after a
sufficient amount of time.
3.1 Prerequisites
Essentially, a distributed ledger is a partial ordering of the
block generating events, thus blocks followed the partial
relation denoted by ’→’. For two blocks a and b, if a comes
before b, then a → b. Given assumption of synchronous
network environment, the time is dividend into discrete
units called slots to measure upper bounded delay in block
proposal and finality operations. In a distributed system,
it is hard to say that one of two events occurred first
given synchronous time discrepancies among participants.
Therefore, we introduce logical clocks called ticks, which
can be used to totally order the events [17]. In general, each
slot slt is indexed by tick t, where tick could be represented
as monotonically increasing integers t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}. To
ensure liveness, the length of time window represented
by a slot should be sufficient to guarantee that message
transmitted by a sender will be received by its intended
recipient within that time window (accounting for local time
discrepancies and network delays). The upper bounded
delay is defined as ∆, then slt ≥ ∆, where t ∈ {1, 2, 3, ...}.
Each participant must finish registration process to join
the permissioned blockchain network. A asymmetric key
pair generation functionality creates a signing-verification
keys pair (ski, pki) for user ui, and user’s credit stake
ci ≤ Cmax, where Cmax is maximum value of credit
stake, is associated with user’s public key pki. All regis-
tered users in system can be represented as a set U =
{(pk1, c1), (pk2, c2), ..., (pkn, cn)}, where n is the registered
user’s number.
3.2 Basic Concepts
Before introducing the microchain architecture, several basic
definitions are defined as following:
Definition 1. Epoch - An epoch is a set of R sub-sequential
slots, represented as e = {sl1, sl2, ..., slt}, where 0 ≤ t ≤
R. The R value is epoch size that is multiple unit slot sl.
Definition 2. Validator - A validator vi ∈ V (V ⊆ U ) is
a registered user who is qualified for final-committee
selection and performing a consensus algorithm.
Definition 3. Dynasty - A dynasty is a set
of current final-committee members D =
{(pk1, c1), (pk2, c2), ..., (pkk, ck) ⊆ V }, where
0 ≤ k ≤ K , and the K value is committee size.
The dynasty is selected from validator set V based on
final committee selection algorithm, and dynamic life
time is multiple epochs.
Definition 4. Block - A block generated at a slot slt
(t ∈ 1, 2, 3, ..) by validator vj is represented as Bi =
(pre hash, height, tx data, slt, pkj , σj). where the pa-
rameters are:
• pre hash: is a λ-bit-length hash string of
previous Block Bi−1, which is represented as
H(Bi−1)=H(pre hash, height, tx data, slt−1),
where H(·) is a pre-defined collision-resistant hash
function that output hash string h ∈ {0, 1}λ;
• height: height of current block in blockchain (ledger);
• tx data: transactions data d ∈ {0, 1}∗;
• slt: block generated time stamp at slt;
• pkj : public key of validator that proposes the block;
and
• σj : a signature Signskj (tx data, pre hash, height, slt)
signed by sender pkj .
Definition 5. Genesis Block - The genesis block is a special
block which is defined asB0 = (pre hash = 0, height =
0, sl0 = 0, init D), where init D is the initial dynasty.
Definition 6. Blockchain - A blockchain (or public ledger) C
is a partial order of blocks B0 → B1 → ... → Bn−1 →
Bn associated with a strictly increasing sequence of slots
slt. Each blockBi use pre hash=H(Bi−1) to chain previ-
ous block Bi−1. The significant parameters are described
as follows:
• length: is the length of chain denoted len(C) = n
to count number of blocks between genesis block B0
and confirmed Bn;
• head: indicates the head of chain denoted head(C) =
Bn, whereBn is last confirmed block that is extended
on finalized main chain.
Given the above definitions, the next sub-section ex-
plains how the final committee consensus protocol works
on a microchain architecture.
5Fig. 1. Microchain architecture overview.
3.3 Architecture Overview
The blockchain structure is illustrated as upper Fig. 1.
The blue nodes represent confirmed blocks while red ones
indicate finalized blocks. The genesis block is the root
node of blockchain, and each block use its pre hash to
point to parent block and extend chain. The chain height
follows a strictly increasing sequence of finalized blocks
(path through red nodes). The head of blockchain is a last
confirmed block whose parent is finalized and has largest
height. The lower Fig. 1 demonstrates key components in
microchain network, and the work flows are described as
follows:
• Initialization: In initialization process, a special dy-
nasty, which includes a group of validators speci-
fied by administer, acts as initial committee Dinit to
initialize blockchain. Each validator creates genesis
block B0 and sets the local blockchain C = B0
and head = B0. The initial committee will work as
the first dynasty of system until following dynasty
change finished. Thus, B0 is beginning block of ini-
tial dynasty epoch.
• Committee Selection: If the current dynasty is the
initial committee, then skip this step. Otherwise, at
the beginning of new dynasty life time, the final-
committee formation protocol exploits a Verifiable
Random Function (VRF) based cryptographic sor-
tition scheme [12] to randomly choose a subset of
validators V as final-committee according to their
credit weight. The selected committee members D
will be added to current block, which is marked as
beginning block of new dynasty epoch. The life time
of dynasty epoch starts from committee selection and
ends after dynasty change.
• Block Proposal: The block proposal mechanism uses
a pure PoS protocol, called Proof-of-Credit (PoC),
to generate new blocks in each block proposal run.
Only validators in the current dynasty is able to
propose new block. The probability that a user could
proposes a block is associated with its credit dis-
tribution of current dynasty. If validator vj could
solve puzzle difficulty problem in slot slt+1 by
computing H(Bi, pkj , cj) ≤ dcond (dcond is diffi-
culty condition target value), it generates new block
Bi+1 = (H(Bi), height+ 1, tx data, Tstamp, pkj , σj)
and broadcasts it with a valid signature to all com-
mittee members of the current dynasty. Each com-
mittee member accept all valid blocks in the current
slot, and verifies if blocks meet confirmation require-
ments. The verified block will be added to local chain
C with head = Bi+1.
• Chain Finality: At the end of an epoch, the head with
epoch height becomes a checkpoint which is used
to resolve forks and finalize chain history. The chain
finality uses a voting-based algorithm to commit
checkpoint block and finalizes those already com-
mitted blocks on the main chain. The chain finality
ensures that only one path including finalized blocks
becomes a main chain, as Fig. 1 shows. Therefore,
the following blocks in new epoch are only extended
on such unique main chain. The chain fork problem
is prevent by resolving conflicting checkpoints and
finalizing the history of the blockchain.
• Committee Change: At the end of dynasty life time,
the current committee members make agreement
on a new dynasty randomness string. The epoch
randomness string generation uses the RandShare
mechanism to make agreement on proposing the
next epoch randomness string among members of
final committee. RandShare is an randomness pro-
tocol which is based on Publicly Verifiable Secret
Sharing (PVSS) [28], [31] to ensure unbiasability, un-
predictability, and availability in public randomness
sharing. The proposed unbiasable and unpredictable
public randomness string will be used for committee
selection process of the next dynasty life time.
As two core functions in epoch life time of blockchain
extension: block proposal and chain finality, detail designs
are explained in following sections.
4 POC-BASED BLOCK PROPOSAL MECHANISM
The PoC-based block proposal mechanism is mainly respon-
sible for generating blocks and extending chains. Essentially,
our PoC-based block proposal mechanism is a pure chain-
based proof of stake, which mimics proof of work mechanics
and simulates mining by pseudorandomly assigning block
proposal right to validators. The block generation relies on a
slot leader selection process which is associated with credit
distribution D of current dynasty. A chain extension rule
ensures that new blocks are growing on the finalized main
chain and prevents against conflicting blocks.
4.1 Transaction Pooling
Each use could send transactions to interact with blockchain
network. The transaction is defined as following:
Definition 7. (Transaction). A transaction is represented
as tx = {tx hash, pksender, pkrecipient, Tstamp, data, σ}
(tx ∈ {0, 1}∗), where:
• tx hash: is a λ-bit-length hash string of
transaction tx, which is represented as
6tx hash=H(pksender, pkrecipient, Tstamp, data),
where H(·) is a pre-defined collision-resistant hash
function that output hash string h ∈ {0, 1}λ;
• pksender : is the sender’s public key;
• pkrecipient: is the recipient’s public key;
• Tstamp: is time stamp of generating transaction;
• data: is information d ∈ {0, 1}∗ enclosed by transac-
tion;
• σ: a signature Sign(tx hash, pksender, pkrecipient,
Tstamp, data) signed by sender’s private key
sksender .
After receiving those transactions broadcasted on the
network, each validator verifies received transactions ac-
cording to the following conditions:
i) sender and recipient are registered users in U , and
V erify(tx hash, pksender, pkrecipient, Tstamp, data) =
σ by using sender’s public key pksender ;
ii) transaction tx should neither be existed in transac-
tions pool nor the last κ committed blocks; and
iii) Time stamp Tstamp must fall in either current time
slot or past sequential slots of last κ committed block;
The condition i) could prevent against transactions from
invalid users or any malicious modification. While condition
ii) and iii) are mainly for preventing duplicated tx in κ + 1
period of time slots. After the verification process, only valid
transactions are cached as local transactions pool denoted as
TX = {tx1, tx2, ..., txN}, where N is transactions pool size.
The validator also uses condition iii) to regularly check local
transaction pool to remove those outdated transactions,
which has not been confirmed by the last κ committed
blocks.
4.2 Slot Leader Selection
For each slot slt in Epoch e = {sl1, sl2, ..., slR}, a random
slot leader selection process determines if a validator vi
is able to propose a new block for current block given
the probability pi is proportional to its weight by credit
ci in current dynasty. The credit distribution is defined as
following:
Definition 8. Credit Distribution - is represented as D =
{p1, p2, ..., pK}, where pj = cj∑K
j=1 cj
and K is committee
size.
To become a slot leader to propose new block, a validator
must show its proof by solving a puzzle problem. Unlike
PoW that utilizes a brute-force manner to find a nonce to
meet the uniform target difficulty, each validator vj simply
computes proof based on chain head block and its credit
cj . The target difficulty that is associated with its credit
weight pj determines if proof is valid or not. The Proof-
of-Credit (PoC) puzzle and solution can be formally defined
as follows:
Definition 9. Proof-of-Credit - Given an adjustable difficulty
condition parameter ξ, the process of PoC puzzle so-
lution aims to verify a solution string hc, which is the
hashcode of concatenation of H(head(C)), pkj and cj ,
such that the value calculated by taking ξ length lower
bits of the hc is smaller than a target value generated by
difficulty condition dcond(ξ, pj):
T B(hc, ξ) ≤ dcond(ξ, pj) (1)
where hc = H(H(head(C)), pkj , cj); T B(hc, ξ) function
outputs lower ξ bits of the hashcode hc; and difficulty
condition function dcond(·, ·) is denoted as:
dcond(ξ, pj) = (2
ξ − 1) · pj (2)
where dcond(ξ, pj) ∈ {0, 1}ξ .
Given the above definition, the PoC-enabled slot leader
selection process is described as the following:
• Block Proposal: during the current time slot slt, each
validator vj in dynasty regularly calculates hashcode
hc based on current status of credit stake cj , and use
Eq. (1) to determine if it is qualified to propose a new
block. If the candidate solution T B(hc, ξ) is smaller
than target value defined by Eq.2, then he gener-
ates a new block Bi+1 = (H(head(C)), height +
1, tx data, Tstamp, pkj , σj) and broadcasts it to the
network. The validator vj with higher credit weight
pj is easier to calculate solution string hc that falls
into range of [0, (2ξ− 1) · pj ]. Thus, he has the higher
probability to become a slot leader to propose a new
block. Furthermore, parameters used for calculating
hashcode hc are not changed in current slot time.
Therefore, the hc is a fixed value, and each validator
is only allowed to propose one block in current slot
time.
• Block Verification: after receiving proposed block
Bi+1, each validator vj firstly checks if sender pkj
is a valid committee member and verifies signature
σ by using the sender’s public key pkj . If block is
from valid committee member with correct signa-
ture, then he will check if Tstamp falls in time slot slt
duration, Bi+1[height] = head(C)[height] + 1 and
Bi+1[pre hash] = H(head(C)). Finally, validator
verifies proof of solution to block Bi+1 based on
the PoC algorithm defined in Eq.1. If all conditions
are true, block is accepted as confirmed status and
validator updates head of local chain as head(C) =
Bi+1. Those sequential verification operations ensure
that only valid blocks generated in the current time
slot slt with correct proof of solution are appended
to head of local chain.
Compared to PoW-based leader selection process, like
Bitcoin, our PoC have the following advantages:
• Energy efficiency: Since input parameters for calculat-
ing hc is fixed in one time slot, so a validator just
executes the PoC mining task once to know if he is
qualified for proposing new block in current leader
selection round. Such mining method is more energy
efficient than PoW-based solutions, which uses a
computation-intensive mechanism to win the puzzle-
solving race;
• High Throughput: The block proposal operation is
only performed by validators in the current commit-
tee D with limited K members, it’s easier to ensure
a synchronous network assumption that time slot slt
7for block proposal rounds could be no more than up-
per bounded delay constraints ∆. Given assumption
that each block only encloses fixed amount of trans-
actions with same data size, the block confirmation
time is only related to length of time slot slt. The high
throughput rate is achieved by correctly choosing a
short slt ≥ ∆.
4.3 Chain Extension Rule
In general, the chain extension follows a ”largest height of
confirmed block” rule, which requires that new blocks Bi+1
are only appended to head(C) by setting Bi+1[pre hash] =
H(head(C)). Although slot leader selection process allows
that the probability of block generated by validator vj is
proportional to its credit weight pj , it cannot ensure that
only one block is proposed in the current block proposal
time slot. The amount of candidate blocks b could be be-
tween 0 and dynasty size K . Given candidate block number
b ∈ [0,K] in current time slot, the chain extension rules are
described as follows:
i) b = 1: if there is only one proposed candidate block
Bi+1, then block is accepted as confirmed status and
update the chain head as head(C) = Bi+1;
ii) b > 1: if more than one candidate blocks are pro-
posed, then all blocks are accepted as confirmed
status. The head(C) update follows two sub rules:
1) chain head points to a block whose sender has the
highest credit c than other blocks’ senders; and 2) if
there more than one candidate blocks who have the
same highest credit c, the block who has the smallest
PoC condition value T B(hc, ξ) becomes the chain
head; and
iii) b = 0: if no proposed block is received before the
end of current time slot, an empty block denoted as
Bempty = (pre hash, height+1, null, slt, null, null)
is generated as Bi+1 and accepted as confirmed
status. The chain head update process follows the
rule i) b = 1.
The rule i) covers a basic scenario to ensure that all
blocks are extended on chain head. The rule ii) could handle
conflicting blocks scenario when multiple validators pro-
pose blocks in current time slot. The rule iii) ensures the
liveness, so that there is at least one block is available for
chain extension even if none validator is able to propose a
new block.
5 VOTING-BASED CHAIN FINALITY MECHANISM
Although the block proposal process follows the pre-defined
chain extension rules, the fork issue still happens owing to
network latency or attacks like ”nothing at stake”. In addi-
tion, through forcing reorganization of the block chain, at-
tacks could change transactions of ledger to launch double-
spending attack. Furthermore, the cost of attack may have
been lower, since attackers just need to accumulate amount
of credit value to be able to propose blocks with high
probability, rather than be punished when their violating be-
haviors are been detected. To prevent above issues, a voting-
based chain finality mechanism is introduced to solidify the
block chain history and increase cost of attack behaviors by
Fig. 2. Chain finality protocol based on checkpoint tree
way of properly designing punishment strategies. Our chain
finality mechanism borrows idea from Casper [7], which
is a PoS-based finality system overlaying an existing PoW
blockchain.
5.1 Checkpoint Finality Protocol
Under ideal scenarios, the PoC-based block proposal mecha-
nism will propose blocks one after other and extend chain in
a linked list, which each parent block has exactly one child
block. However, owing to fork issues caused by network
latency or deliberate attacks, the block proposal mechanism
will inevitably produce multiple conflicting blocks which
are children blocks with the same parent block. Therefore,
those proposed blocks in fact form an ever-growing block
tree structure, as shown in Fig. 2. The chain finality protocol
is mainly to identify a unique chain path on block tree
by choosing a single child block from multiple children
blocks with common parent block. For efficiency purposes,
the chain finality protocol is only executed on those check-
point blocks rather than whole block tree, and committee
members vote for hashes of blocks instead of entire block
contents. Before describing the voting-based chain finality
protocol, several basic definitions are defined as following:
Definition 10. Checkpoint - An block Bi whose height in
block tree is multiple of epoch size R is specified as
checkpoint. If a block is checkpoint, then Bi[height]
mod R = 0.
Definition 11. Epoch Height - indicates current height of
epoch for block Bi, which is denoted as He(Bi) =
bBi[height]R c.
Definition 12. Vote - A vote for checkpoint block target
sent by validator vj at time Tstamp is represented
as V otej = (vote hash, hsource, htarget, He(source),
He(target), Tstamp, pkj , σj). where the parameters are:
• vote hash: is a λ-bit-length hash
string of V otej , which is repre-
sented as H(V otej)=H(hsource, htarget,
He(source), He(target), Tstamp, pkj), where H(·) is
a pre-defined collision-resistant hash function that
output hash string h ∈ {0, 1}λ;
8• hsource: the hash of any committed block;
• htarget: the hash of a checkpoint block which is the a
decedent of source block;
• He(source): epoch height of source block Bs;
• He(target): epoch height of target block Bt;
• Tstamp: time stamp the vote is proposed;
• pkj : public key of validator that sends the vote; and
• σj : a signature denoted as
Signskj (vote hash, hsource, htarget, He(target),
He(source), Tstamp) signed by sender pkj .
During time slot slt of chain finality process, every
validator vj in current dynasty casts a votej message for
committing a checkpoint block. Given the voting result, the
checkpoint block has following proprieties:
• Committed-majority Link: Given an ordered pair of
checkpoint blocks (Bs, Bt) denoted as Bs → Bt, if
more than 2/3 of validators propose vote for it, then
relationship Bs → Bt is called a committed-majority
link. As Fig. 2 shown, both B0 → B3 and B3 → B6
are committed-majority link.
• Committed Block: A checkpoint block Bt is called
committed block if 1) Bt is genesis block, or 2) there
exists a committed-majority link Bs → Bt where Bs
is a committed block.
• Finalized Block: A checkpoint block Bs is called fi-
nalized block if 1) Bs is genesis block, or 2) Bs is
a committed block, and there exists a committed-
majority link Bs → Bt, where Bs is parent of Bt
in checkpoint tree (He(Bt) = He(Bs) + 1).
The voting-based chain finality protocol utilizes check-
point blocks to form a checkpoint tree to finalize chain
history. Figure 2 illustrates a checkpoint tree with a finalized
chain along commit-majority links B0 → B3 → B6. The
gray nodes represent all confirmed blocks generated by
block proposal mechanism, while all checkpoint blocks are
shown as squire boxes. Assuming that epoch size R = 3,
all blocks with (height mod 3) = 0 are considered as
checkpoint blocks, such as B0, B3, B
′
3 and B6. The B0 and
B3 are finalized blocks while B
′
3 and B6 are committed
blocks. The chain finality workflow is described as follows:
• Sending Votes: during current time slot slt for chain
finality process, a validator vj in current dynasty
checks if He(head(C)) = He(Bc) + 1, where Bc is
the last committed block of local chain C. If yes, it
prepares V otej which votes for a new committed-
majority link Bc → head(C), and broadcasts signed
vote message V otej to committee members.
• Counting Votes: After receiving proposed vote V otej ,
each validator vi (i ∈ K) check if V otej is from a
valid validator and σj is correctly signed by sender’s
pkj . Then, the validator will verify whether received
vote violates the chain fork resolving rules defined
in 5.2. If no violation behavior is founded, the valida-
tor will updates vote count[hsource, htarget] value by
adding 1. Each validator keeps tracking votes count
until slt expiration.
• Finalizing Checkpoint: A committed-majority link
Bs → Bt) is only accepted when vote count is more
than a certain threshold T ·K , where T is a fraction
Fig. 3. Illustration of chain fork resolving rules.
of the committee size K . The chain finality process
requires that more than 2f + 1 of participants to
be honest with f fault nodes in current committee,
so that T ≥ 2f+1N where N = 3f + 1. Given
T = 23 , if vote count > 2K3 (K is committee size),
the checkpoint block Bt is accepted as a committed
block, whereas committed block Bs is changed to a
finalized block.
Given assumption that time slot slt ≥ ∆, so that all val-
idators could receive broadcasted votes by end of bounded
delay. If no more than 13 of the validators violate the chain
fork resolving rule, only a committed block is finalized even
if there are conflicting checkpoint blocks in same epoch
height.
5.2 Chain Fork Resolving Rule
If two checkpoint blocks Bi and B
′
i have the same epoch
height He but are in distinct branches, they are conflicting
checkpoint blocks. In other words, the checkpoint blocks in
checkpoint tree are sibling nodes who are neither ancestors
nor descendants of each other. As shown in Fig. 2, B3 and
B
′
3 are conflicting checkpoint blocks in He = 1. To handle
conflicting checkpoint blocks and resolve the fork condition
in the chain finality process, a set of chain fork resolving
rules are defined as follows:
Rule 1. Given a vote V otej = (vote hash, hs, ht,
He(s), He(t), Tstamp, pkj , σj), if He(t) 6= He(head(C)
or He(t) 6= He(s) + 1, the voter j violates rule and
V otej will be rejected. This rule ensures that vote for
committed-majority s → t is accepted only if t is the
same epoch height as local chain head and s is parent of
t in checkpoint tree.
Rule 2. Given two votes (vote hash, hs1, ht1,
He(s1), He(t1), Tstamp, pkj , σj) and
(vote hash, hs2, ht2, He(s2), He(t2), Tstamp, pkj , σj)
from the same voter j, if t1 6= t2 and He(t1) = He(t2),
the voter j violates rule and all votes from voter will be
rejected. This rule prevents one voter from voting for
distinct checkpoint blocks with the same epoch height.
9Figure 3 demonstrates scenarios that how voter violates
above defined fork rules. A validator who voted for distinct
target blocks B3 and B
′
3 in the same epoch height violates
the rule 2. Since B
′
3 is not ancestor of B6, any sender voting
for link B
′
3 → B6 violates rule 1. Similarly, voting for link
B0 → B6 is also considered as violation of rule 1 owing to
condition He(B6) 6= He(B0) + 1.
5.3 Incentives
In order to encourage participants to contribute honest
protocol operations to distributed ledger, a reward can be
given to the validators that are proposing, verifying blocks
and voting for finalized checkpoint blocks. The rewards in
our setting are fees and credit value. At end of dynasty
epoch, all fees of transactions included in a sequence of
blocks in current committee are collected as a rewarding
fees pool, then it will be distributed to all honest validators
who have no record of violating behaviors. In addition, each
honest validator vi will also be added 1 credit value to his
credit stake ci. The higher credit stake c, the more benefit
that participant can earn by being selected as committee
member and committing honest protocol actions.
Given violations of chain fork resolving rules, a pun-
ishment strategy is also introduced to discourage dishonest
behaviors. To become a committee member in committee
selection process, a participant vi must deposit a fix number
of fees to his special stake sci, called security stake. If any
dishonest behaviors of validator vi are detected, such as
violations of chain fork resolving rules, his balance of sci
will be slashed as punishment. Furthermore, validator vi
will also lose 1 credit value from his credit stake ci. Such
punishment strategy not only increase economical cost of
dishonest behavior by slashing his security stake, but also
decrease the capability of attackers by lowing their credit
stakes.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
To verify the proposed solution, a concept-proof proto-
type of microchain is implemented in Python, consisting
of approximate 3000 lines of code. We use Flask [1], which
provide a micro-framework for Python application, to de-
velop networking and web service functions. All security
functions are developed by using standard python lib:
cryptography [3]. The key generation and signature are
implemented over RSA and hash function uses SHA-256.
we use SQLite [4], which is an lightweight and embedded
SQL database engine, to manage data such as node, block
and vote information.
The prototype is deployed on a physical network en-
vironment including multiple nodes. Table 1 describes de-
vices used for the experimental setup. Five validators are
deployed on desktop while other validators run on sixteen
distributed Raspberry Pis to simulate IoTs. Each validator is
only deployed on one host machine.
6.1 Network Latency
In this experiment, all validators are running on Raspberry
Pis to evaluate network latency of executing microchain on
IoT devices. Figure 4 plots the time that takes for microchain
TABLE 1
Configuration of Experimental Nodes.
Device Dell Optiplex 760 Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+
CPU 3 GHz Intel Core
TM (2 cores)
Broadcom ARM Cortex A53
(ARMv8) , 1.4GHz
Memory 4GB DDR3 1GB SDRAM
Storage 250G HHD 32GB (microSD card)
OS Ubuntu 16.04 Raspbian GNU/Linux
(Jessie)
Fig. 4. Latency for one round of microchain with different node size.
to complete a entire round of final-committee consensus
given the number of validators varying from 4 to 16. The
block size is 128KB in test to focus on network performance
by reducing block size influence.
The whole process of one round is divided into three
parts, which is demonstrated as three lines. The latency of
commit transaction Tct, at the bottom of Fig. 4, is the time
for all nodes of dynasty to accept a broadcasted transac-
tion. Since the communication complexity of broadcasting
transaction is O(K). The latency of committing transaction
is linear scale to committee size K , and it varies from 162
ms to 246 ms.
The line in the middle of graph indicates latency of
block proposal Tbp, which measure how long the proposed
blocks could be arrived and verified among validators.
Since the block proposal algorithm is proportion to credit
distributuionD whth expectation E(D), the latency of block
proposal is scale to communication complexity O( K2E(D) ).
Given uniform distribution D in our test with E(D) = K ,
so that the middle line is almost linear scale to the O(K)
with vary from 0.5 s to 1.7 s.
Finally, the latency of chain finality, at the top of the
graph, is the time it takes voting process for finalize check-
point block to complete among all nodes. Since voting-based
chain finality process has the communication complexity
O(K2), the top line indicates the latency of chain finality
Tcf , which is greatly influenced by the number of nodes.
Given 16 validators in committee, the latency could be 21.5
s, while the scenario with four nodes only introduces 1.4 s
latency.
The results show that microchain could perform one
round of final-committee consensus no more than half
minute (Tct + Tbp + Tcf ) given committee size m = 16.
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Although chain finality process introduces larger latency
as increasing committee size, properly configuring epoch
size R could mitigate the influence. The block confirmation
time denotes as Tbc =
Tcf+Tbp·R
R , given R = 10 so that
chain finality is triggered every 10 block height increases,
Tbc = (21.5 + 2.5 × 10)/10 ≈ 4.6 s. Compared with
block generation time of Ethereum blockchain with 9.35 s
in private network [36] and about 15 s in public network,
the proposed microchain mechanism demonstrates lower
block confirmation time. Since the block confirmation time
of network is normalized to committee size K , properly
choose committee size and designing committee selection
algorithm could improve scalability of microchain in IoT
applications.
6.2 Throughput Evaluation
In the following set of experiments, we deploy five valida-
tors in committee to focus on throughput and cost eval-
uation by limiting committee size influence, which are all
Raspberry Pi devices. Figure 5 plots the time that takes for
microchain to complete a entire round of final-committee
consensus with a varying block size between 512K and 4M.
The results show that latency of running consensus algo-
rithm is scale to the block size in microchain. Considering
the scenario with lowest latency, microchain finalizes a 512
KBytes block in about 8.9 s, which means it could finalize
202 Mbytes of transaction data per hour. For comparison,
Bitcoin achieves throughput of processing 6 MBytes trans-
action data per hour by committing a 1 Mbytes block per 10
minutes.
The throughput could be specified as Th =
Tct+Tbp+Tcf
Block size × 3600 (M/h), where M/h means Mbytes per
hour. Then we can get throughput with varying block size:
Th512K=202 (M/h), Th1M=293 (M/h), Th2M=405 (M/h),
and Th4M=263 (M/h). The above throughput results with
varying block size suggests that increasing the block size
allows committing more transaction data, and therefore
reach a throughput which maximizes the system capability.
In our test, running microchain with 2M block size outputs
highest throughput 405 (M/h). As block size increases, how-
ever, microchain achieves higher throughput at the cost of
increasd latency, and throughput is constrained by network
and system capability.
Fig. 5. Latency for one round of microchain with different block size.
Fig. 6. Performance of running microchain with different block size.
Fig. 7. Performance of running microchain with different platform.
6.3 Performance of Running Microchain
To evaluate the cost of performing microchain on host
machine, running time for key operations are calculated
given different block size and hardware platforms. Figure
6 demonstrates the computational overhead of key tasks
for completing a entire round of final-committee consensus
on Raspberry Pi with varying block size. The results show
that computation overhead increases as bloc size grows.
Compared with verify transaction and mining block opera-
tions, the verify block and verify vote operations introduces
major overhead to host machine. Since verify transaction
and mining block process rely on database querying to
validate chain data, therefore they require more computing
resource on data processing and are sensitive to block size
growth.
Figure 7 show the cost of running microchain with 1M
block size on both desktop and Raspberry Pi. All key tasks
for completing a entire round of final-committee consensus
introduces higher computational cost on Raspberry Pi B+
owning to constrained resource. The CPU usage for running
microchain is modest on both platform. It is about 15% on
Raspberry Pi B+ and 10% on desktop, and most of CPU
consumption is used for verifying signature, calculating
hash value and access to the database. Compared with
PoW-based consensus protocol that occupies almost all CPU
usage, proposed PoC-VCF based final-committee consensus
in microchain only introduced lighter overhead on the host
machine.
6.4 Security Discussions
Since the adversary is subject to the usual cryptographic
hardness assumptions, he/she is aware of neither the pri-
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vate keys of the honest nodes nor the input string x to the
VRF function. Therefore, the unpredictability property of
the VRF-based randomness string generation allows mem-
bers of committee be completely random. In addition, the
chain finality requires n ≥ 3f + 1 to make agreements on
checkpoints. Therefore, the adversary has at most m = 1/4
chance per round to control the checkpoint voting process.
As a result, the probability that an adversary controls n
consecutive checkpoint is upper-bounded by P [X ≥ n] =
1
4n < 10
−λ. For λ = 6, the adversary will control at most 10
consecutive chain finality runs.
The security proprieties of micorchain could mitigate the
following attacks:
• Double spending attacks: In a double spending attack,
the adversary attempts to revert a transaction which
is confirmed in the blockchain network. The chain
finality ensures persistence, so that once transaction
is finalized in checkpoint block, all other honest
nodes will work on finalized chain and disregard the
double spending transaction.
• Transaction denial attacks: The adversary could start
a transaction denial attack by preventing a cer-
tain transaction from becoming confirmed. However,
such a attack is not feasible owing to the liveness
provided by microchain. Once a transaction is suc-
cessfully enclosed in a proposed block for a sufficient
number of time slots, it will be eventually finalized
by the chain finality process.
• Long-range attacks: In a long-range attacks, the ad-
versary wishes to double spend at a later point of
time by locally computing a longer valid chain that
starts from genesis block and presenting such longer
alternative chain to revert his previous confirmed
transaction. Since the committee selection is unpre-
dictable, and any blocks that are not proposed by
committee members will be rejected. Therefore, it’s
difficult for the adversary to control the committee
selection, and his local chain cannot be accept by
committee member. Furthermore, the chain finality
ensures that valid blocks are only extended alone
longest finalized chain, so that the adversary’s alter-
native chain is invalid and will be rejected.
• Selfish-mining: In a selfish-mining attack, the attacker
tries to withhold blocks and release them strategi-
cally to reduce chain growth and increase the relative
ratio of his proposed blocks. However, our reward
and punishment mechanism make such attack be-
come unprofitable. Only honest validators without
violating behavior will receive rewards proportion-
ally to their contributions. The rational validators
attempt to behave honestly and make contribution
to increase credit stake.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This work proposes microchain, a hybrid blockchain net-
work that provides scalable and lightweight distribute
ledger for IoT systems. Through performing PoC-VCF con-
sensus protocol in a small group of validators, called final-
committee, microchain could effectively reduce communi-
cation complexity and improve performance, i.e. in terms
of confirmation time and throughput. The VRF-based cryp-
tographic sortition and unbiased randomness generation
allow committee selection be unpredictable, therefore it
increases scalablity of microchain. The experimental results
demonstrate that microchain achieves higher throughput
than PoW-based blockchain solutions, and it introduces
lower network latency and modest computational overhead
on IoT devices like Raspberry Pi. The microchain offers a
prospective distributed ledger solution to IoT application
scenarios in term of security, scalability and lightweight.
There remains a number of open issues in designing
microchain. Although committee selection could improve
scalability of microchain, more investigation and test are
needed to evaluate how committee selection algorithm scale
to network size. Another challenge is redesigning chain
structure to address the ever-growing chain data size, which
has a great impact on computation and storage capability of
IoT devices.
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